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SOME ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN
TERMINATING FRANCHISES
GEORGE J. WADE*

Accessibility of even the most remote sections of the country to
the nationally promoted brand has drastically affected distribution
methods. For a while it seemed that the chain store would eliminate
the small proprietorship from any significant place in retailing, but
recently the small businessman has found a place as the franchisee for
one or more nationally promoted products. Since the inception and
operation of a franchising scheme have often been discussed, we shall
consider some antitrust factors which affect any decision to terminate
a franchise.' Specifically, our analysis will focus upon terminations, or
refusals to deal, involving resale price maintenance and certain other
restrictions, and upon expanded treble-damage liabilities and the
possibility of a disgruntled terminated franchisee bringing a class
action under the amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.2
INTRODUCTION

In setting up a franchise, the parties, in their agreement, should
take into account what may happen when one of them decides that it
should be terminated. 3 Unfortunately, many franchisors seem to think
the problems can be solved by merely writing clauses into contracts
permitting termination on short notice by either party. Antitrust problems will persist, however, since the courts will not allow the franchisor
to enforce an objectionable course of operations by exercising the unilateral right of termination which he has built into the contract.
The cut-off franchisee has always had the prerogative to go to
the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC), or to the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, with a complaint on the basis
of which an action could be brought. But that, as a practical matter,
requires proof of an antitrust violation affecting a significant part of
the nation's commerce. Recent cases, however, indicate that the ex-dis* A.B., Fordham University; LL.B., Harvard University.

ISpecific legislation designed for particular situations or industries, such as the Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25, 70 Stat. 1125-26 (1956); Miller-Tydings Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1, 50 Stat. 693 (1937); or state fair trade laws, are beyond the scope of this

article.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3 The United States Supreme Court last year brought home the clear necessity of
anticipating such problems in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392

U.S. 134 (1968).
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tributor can go directly to the courts with his private complaint as a
well-armed, confident, treble-damage plaintiff. The result is that the
manufacturer faces greatly escalated dangers of having made an erroneous antitrust decision concerning termination. This is particularly
true of a franchisor who, with a uniformity of contract and operation,
is clearly a candidate for a class action complaint. The problems involve not only the time and method of termination, but also the effect
of the terms of the agreement and the course of dealing upon any
potential antitrust liability.
Under ordinary circumstances a franchise agreement, like any
other contract, is terminable in accordance with its terms by either
party. But, like any other contract, action taken pursuant to it must
not contravene the antitrust laws; for example, the action must not be
part of any illegal plan or combination in violation of the Sherman
Act. 4 It is also evident that termination of a franchisee's contract for
whatever reason is simply a refusal to deal with him, and thus, the
manufacturer who wants to terminate a franchise should be certain
that his act is not forbidden under Sections 1r or 26 of the Sherman
Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act 7 or Section 5 of the Federal Trade
8
Commission Act.
Essentially, the Sherman Act forbids any contract, combination
or conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade, 9 and outlaws monopolization practices and any attempts to monopolize. 10 On the dealership
level, it may very well be a violation of the Sherman Act to attempt to
monopolize distribution of a particular branded product in a given
area." Furthermore, the Federal Trade Commission Act gives the FTC
the power to restrain those anti-competitive acts which may not be
specifically within the purview of the Clayton or Sherman Acts.' 2 In
addition, the franchisor should ascertain that his agreements comply
with the provisions of the Clayton Act which make it unlawful to
4 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 575 (4th Cir. 1963); McKesson & Robbins,
Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964). A contractual provision
gives no more immunity from an antitrust violation than from any other tort. Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1948).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
6 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
7 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
8 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
10 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
11 Termination is not forbidden merely because elimination leaves only one distributor in the area. E. A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293, 298-99 (E.D.
I1. 1968).
12 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
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refuse to deal with a distributor on the ground that the latter is handling goods of a competitor where the effect of the arrangement "may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce."' 3
In 1919, in United States v. Colgate & Co.,14 the Supreme Court
held that a unilateral refusal to deal did not violate the Sherman Act
because a manufacturer had a right to choose those with whom he
would trade. But the erosion of the Colgate doctrine was dearly evidenced forty-one years later in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,15
when the rule was severely limited and a Sherman Act violation was
found in a refusal to deal with those who cut prices plus any activity
by the supplier beyond mere announcement of a resale price maintenance policy.
That there is still life in the Colgate doctrine is one of the more
oft-repeated judicial dicta. That does not mean it is practically helpful;
even less does it mean that prudent businessmen should guide their
conduct in reliance on it. Notwithstanding Colgate, the courts have
experienced no difficulty in finding a combination or conspiracy which
is pejoratively termed "group boycott" and declared illegal per se under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 6 Clearly a concerted refusal to deal, a
horizontal agreement among entities at the same level of distribution,
does amount to an illegal group boycott. 7 Furthermore, such a boycott
is illegal notwithstanding the size of the commercial area affected:
"[I]t is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.""' But there is still truth to the notion that a
manufacturer can choose those whom he will have as his distributors,
provided the choice is not motivated or guided by anti-competitive
considerations. And it also remains true that the mere substitution of
one dealer for another does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation.' 9 The Second Circuit expressed the rule as follows:
13 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
14 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
15 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
16 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 890 U.S. 145 (1968).
17Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Fashion Originators' Guild
of America, Inc., v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
18 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
19 Scanlan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 388 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 916
(1968); Ace Beer Distribs., Inc. v. Kohn, Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922 (1963); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957). "The
substitution of one distributor for another changes the identity of a competitor in the
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A manufacturer has the right to stop dealing with a distributor
or jobber who is acting unfairly towards his product or is trying to undermine his trade ....
Of course, this right of a manufacturer must be exercised in good
faith, and within the restrictions of the Clayton Act, and may not be
exercised in such a manner so as to "substantially lessen competition"
or "tend to create a monopoly" in any line of commerce.2 0
The motivation for that "mere substitution," as well as the means
the manufacturer chooses, is extremely pertinent to antitrust consequences. Although business purposes irrelevant to any antitrust problems exist, the substitution may be illegal if the real, dominant, or
underlying purpose is the maintenance of resale prices, imposition of
unreasonable territorial restraints, or allocation of the distributors'
customers.
THE COLGATE-PARKE, DAVIS DOCTRINE
AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
An agreement to maintain resale prices has long been held
illegal per se under Section I of the Sherman Act. 21 In addition, any
agreement which fixes a price ceiling is similarly illegal. 22 However, it
must be emphasized that the presence of "a contract, combination or
conspiracy" is essential to any holding of per se illegality under section
1. Hence, it was the determination that such a contract, combination
or conspiracy did not exist that led the Supreme Court to uphold the
arrangement in Colgate.
As the Government conceded, and as Mr. Justice Brennan wrote
in Parke, Davis, "under the Colgate doctrine a manufacturer, having
announced a price maintenance policy, may bring about adherence to
it by refusing to deal with customers who do not observe that policy."23
Thus, a resale price maintenance "announcement plus refusal to deal",
field, but does not by itself eliminate competition." Potter's Photographic Applications
Co. v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The same rule applies when
the manufacturer takes over the distribution. B & B Oil & Chem. Co. v. Franklin Oil
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 1313, 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
20 Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 343, 358 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958).
21 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Implied
agreements are dearly covered by the Dr. Miles doctrine. United States v. A. Schrader's
Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920). The notion that a patentee could set his licensee's
price was based on United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Although
later opinions sharply attacked that rule, it was never overturned; but the Court's
opinion in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), renders its validity quite dubious.
22 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). For a criticism of the Albrecht holding, see The
Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 256-57 (1968).

23 362 U.S. at 37.
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without any other activity, is supposed to keep the manufacturer within
the bounds of antitrust legality even if he does terminate a noncomplying distributor. In Parke, Davis, the manufacturer threatened wholesalers with a refusal to deal "in order to elicit their willingness to deny
Parke Davis products to retailers and thereby help gain the retailers'
adherence to its suggested minimum retail prices." It thus "created a
combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail
prices and violated the Sherman Act." 24 Another court put it this way:
"The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such
Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business
enterprise.1

25

Similar language was utilized by Judge Herlands in his recent
opinion in Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.:26
Today, a manufacturer can avail himself of the Colgate doctrine
only where he suggests a resale price and does not make any attempts
to enforce his suggestion, and he then refuses to sell to dissident distributors. Anything beyond this act of "Doric simplicity" is more than a
unilateral refusal to deal and constitutes a per se violation of the antitrust laws.
Which activities are so Dorically simple and which are announcementplus is not clear from the cases or their language. But an examination
of a few of the more important precedents should convince the prudent
businessman that any refusal to deal with (or termination of) a distributor who has been cutting prices is extremely risky. Furthermore, the
risk has now been escalated because the penalty for guessing wrong is
no longer a mere injunction and a forced remarriage of manufacturer
and franchisee, but includes in addition the possibility of treble-damage
liability to a class composed of all franchisees. 27
After questioning the propriety of such an expansion of the
"conspiracy" doctrine, the future Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, Richard W. McLaren, argued that a simple
unilateral refusal to deal with a given distributor is still governed by
Colgate as the other side of the coin of the undoubtedly unilateral
right to select dealers. "Certainly, in order to be meaningful, the seller's
unilateral right to select his dealers must also include the right to
continue or terminate - and to decide the conditions under which he
24 Id. at 45.
25 George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1960). See Guidry v. Continental Oil Co., 350 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1965).
26
27

295 F. Supp. 711, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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will continue to sell- as well as the right to appoint in the first instance. ' 28 One of the results of the recognition that a "narrow channel"
does in fact remain is that summary judgment may be granted where
the court can find that an illegal combination has not been sufficiently
alleged. 29
The thinness of some of the vertical "combinations" upon which
the courts have relied to impose liability is instructive in stressing the
point made by Judge Madden in 1966 that Colgate "has in practice
offered little protection to manufacturers from the finding of tacit agreements to which section 1 could apply."30 Two automobile dealer cases,
Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc.,3 1 and United States v.
General Motors Corp., 2 were somewhat predictable and have the
following in common: in both, the dealers had combined to shut off a
competitor or class of competitors and had enlisted the manufacturers'
aid to do so. In both, the courts found that the apparently unilateral
action of the manufacturers was in reality action in concert or combination with the dealers. If he is to remain within the Colgate-Parke,
Davis doctrine, the manufacturer must stand absolutely aside from the
dealers. Of course, that may not always be the most desirable position
since, even in cases where protection of a trademark or quality standard
is not at issue, the manufacturer may have a legitimate interest in the
solvency and well-being of his distributors.
In Webster's, Ford sold cars, many of them current models, which
had been used by Ford employees, at auctions open only to authorized
dealers. The plaintiff ran a used-car lot and purchased from a friendly
dealer in another town the so-called "factory Fords" at a $50 markup.
He then resold the cars at considerably lower prices than were offered
by the authorized Ford dealer in his town. The authorized dealer complained to Ford's District Sales Manager in Boston, who directed the
officer in charge of the auctions to "correct the situation." Accordingly,
28McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Distributors and DealersPrices, Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive Products, 13 ANTITRUST
Buru . 161, 165 (1968). McLaren went on to suggest a safer path-the unenforced suggested resale price program. The danger in that course, unfortunately, is that the
supplier runs the risk of FTC action for false advertising or fictitious pricing if the
suggested price is cut by too many dealers.
29 Carbon Steel Prods. Corp. v. Allen Wood Steel Co., 289 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (refusal to deal could not be said to be caused solely by wholesaler's handling of
similar imported steel).
30 Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 879 (lst Cir. 1966). See
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962); FTC Advisory Opinion Digest No. 163,
3 CCH TRADE REG. REt'. 1 18,174 (1968).
31361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966).
82 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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the next bid invitation for "factory Fords" contained a clause "asking"
the dealers not to bid for the purpose of reselling the cars to a wholesaler. Of course, Ford maintained that the insertion of the clause was a
unilateral action on its part. But the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the used-car dealer, and Ford appealed.
From the circumstances, Judge Madden held that the jury could have
found an agreement between Ford and the complaining dealers. He
stressed that such an agreement went beyond the mere vertical territorial allocation which had been questioned but not held per se illegal in
White Motor Co. v. United States.3 3 The objects of the restriction were
the elimination of one class of competitor to the authorized Ford
dealers and the further elimination of price competition in one community. As such, it constituted a group boycott and was unlawful per se.
At about the same time, the Supreme Court decided the General
Motors case. General Motors Corp. (hereinafter GM) had franchised
dealers to sell cars at a specific site, including in the agreement a socalled "Location Clause", by which the dealer was forbidden to move
or to sell at any other site without the consent of GM. A few authorized
Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area entered into agreements with
certain discount houses, under which the discounters would refer
customers to the dealer, who would then sell at below list prices and
give a "cut" to the discount house. 34 Sometimes the discount house was
as much as forty miles away from the dealer, the advantage being that
it served as a central selling place for the dealer and apparently was able
to attract otherwise unreachable customers and those who thought
that dealing with the discount house resulted in bargain prices. By 1960,
discount-house referrals in the Los Angeles area resulted in over 2,000
sales, and the dealers' association thus brought the problem to GM's
attention, impressing the company with the seriousness of the problem
by "flooding" it with telegrams and letters of complaint. GM representatives then determined, again apparently unilaterally, that the practice
was, in fact, a violation of the "Location Clause". The company's corrective action consisted of a visit to each dealer, at which time it was
stressed that such practices were inimical to the proper "business-like"
selling of Chevrolets and thus constituted a violation of the agreement;
furthermore, it was pointed out that each of the other dealers was being
contacted. But no attempt was made to "cut-off" any dealer. However,
33 372 US. 253 (1963).
34 The agreement provided for one or more of several ways of accomplishing the

referral, by the most usual of which the customer would be told to go to the dealer's
place of business where he could buy a Chevrolet at lower than list price, the discount
house receiving a stipulated fee for each sale.
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the original GM plan to police the arrangement unilaterally "was displaced.., in favor of a joint effort between General Motors, the three
appellee associations, and a number of individual dealers.""5
Mr. Justice Fortas found it unnecessary to deal with the legality
of the "Location Clause" but had little difficulty in terming GM's
activities a "classic case" of joint action to boycott: "Elimination, by
joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market is
a per se violation of the Act. '3 6 An explicit agreement is not necessary,
especially under circumstances wherein the parties are and have
been dealing together for a long period of time. The competitive restriction was not vertical, but horizontal, the manufacturer acting with
most of the dealers to eliminate one form of competition on the level
of those selling to the ultimate consumer. The handle used to strike
down the operation was the finding, essential to a section 1 violation,
that the dealers had conspired inter se and with the manufacturer, but
it was a handle rendered substantial by the methods utilized by the
dealers to bring the problem to GM's attention and by the joint enforcement operation.
However, none of the precedents have gone as far in alleging and
finding a conspiracy as have a series of recent newspaper cases. A publisher is interested in the widest circulation possible in his home city so
that his advertising, the main source of his revenue, will yield the
highest rate of profit possible; therefore, he wants to keep down the
price of the newspaper to the reader. The dealer, on the other hand, has
the more common supply-demand problem of achieving the maximum
volume at the maximum price. To meet rising labor costs, in particular,
the dealers have begun to charge a "service fee" which most, but
perhaps not all, subscribers will pay. Publishers, in their desire for
maximum volume, have fought against the imposition of that "service
fee" by the home delivery agency.
Newspaper distribution provides, however, only an extreme example of a fairly general conflict. Usually, the greater the markup
exacted by the dealer, the lower the volume, and normally the profits,
of the manufacturer whose income from any one item is not affected
by price-cutting at the retail level. However, the manufacturer may
35 384 U.S. at 136.
36 Id. at 145. A similar attempt to boycott discount houses arose in a more dearly
horizontal situation, which provided precedent for Justice Fortas' conclusion. Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Klor's and GM hold that vertical territorial or customer restrictions are illegal "where the purpose [is] to prevent the distribution of automobiles to or by 'discounters' ....
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967).
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desire to keep prices up even at the expense of reduced volume over the
short-term, in order to protect his distributors' financial condition,
induce them to perform post-sale services, maintain the "image" of the
product as a "quality" item, make certain it is not being downgraded
as a "loss leader", etc.
In Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,3 7 the question posed
was whether the publisher could cut off a dealer who imposed such a
"service fee." At the time the defendant raised the price of its paper, it
informed its dealers that it would not supply the paper to any dealer
who charged the fee. The only policing undertaken by the publisher
was the monitoring of complaints from subscribers, and he seems to
have attempted to stay within the limits of the Colgate-Parke, Davis
doctrine. The dealers consequently formed an association whose main
purpose was to discuss service fees and raise a litigation fund to support
the first dealer who was cut off. The plaintiff turned out to be that
first dealer.
Judge Higginbotham had little difficulty in denying the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiff.38 The denial was based on
the proposition that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would be successful in substantiating his claim. The court could not find any conspiracy, since it was clear that the publisher had acted unilaterally, 9
and it relied on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc.,40 which held that
advice to all dealers not to cut prices, followed by a dealership termination, did not violate section 1, even if there was arguably "conscious
parallelism" among the dealers. Of course, after General Motors, Klein
became highly suspect as good authority, since the Third Circuit's
requirement in Klein of "some consciousness of commitment to a
common scheme"4' 1 seems to have been virtually eliminated by the later
cases.
Then, in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,4 the Supreme Court over37 233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
38 Had the court thought liability likely to have been shown, the dealer would have

been entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining the publisher to continue to deal
with him. Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); Interphoto
Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.DN.Y. 1969); Kay Instrument Sales Co. v.
Haldex Aktiebolag, 5 CCH TFAxE RaG. REP. 72,488 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1968); McKesson
& Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
39 Further, he could not find any analogy to minimum resale price maintenance
cases because here the publisher was benefiting the consumer by keeping prices down.
But see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 590 U.S. 145 (1968).
40 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
41Id. at 791, quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 516 F.2d 884, 890 (7th Cir.
1963).
42390 US. 145 (1968).
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turned an affirmed jury verdict in a case quite similar to Graham. The
defendant set a suggested retail price for its newspaper which was distributed by independent carriers operating in exclusive territories. The
exclusivity provision was subject to termination if the suggested price
was exceeded. After the plaintiff raised the retail price, the publisher
sent a notice to the plaintiff's subscribers that it would take over delivery to any who were unwilling to pay the higher price, in effect
eliminating the exclusive-territory provision. The defendant hired one
Milne to call on the subscribers and inform them that the publisher
would arrange for other delivery service. About three hundred of the
plaintiff's customers (approximately a quarter) chose to switch, and the
publisher hired one Kroner to service them.
In the Supreme Court opinion, Mr. Justice White repeated the
Parke, Davis interpretation of Colgate, that an illegal combination
exists when the seller suggests the resale price and secures that price by
means beyond a mere announcement and refusal to deal. He found
such means - a combination or conspiracy of the publisher, Milne
and Kroner - notwithstanding the undisputed evidence that Milne
and Kroner were simply employees performing ministerial tasks which
could just as easily have been performed by the publisher. 43 Mr. Justice
White wrote:
If a combination arose when Parke Davis threatened its wholesalers with termination unless they put pressure on their retail
customers, then there can be no doubt that a combination arose between respondent, Milne, and Kroner to force petitioner to conform
44
to the advertised retail prices.

That statement would seem to be a serious misinterpretation of Parke,
Davis. The Parke, Davis conspiracy was a horizontal dealer combination, abetted by the manufacturer; the Albrecht "conspiracy" evaporates
upon analysis into activities controlled by and the work of one economic entity, which may be undesirable but which is not concerted action within the meaning of section 1. This is not to say that such a combination should not be inferred in a proper case; but in Albrecht, all
the facts pointed to exactly the opposite conclusion and resulted in two
anomalies -the
"conspiracy" of dealers getting their way and the
Sherman Act being used to raise prices to the consumer.
What Mr. Justice White intended by his extension of the con43 Clearly the independence and separateness of Milne and Kroner were not nearly as
great as that of Holt and Bartell in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 568 U.S.
464 (1962).
44 390 U.S. at 149.
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spiracy doctrine may be apparent from his suggestion that it may no
longer be necessary to find some handle, like Milne or Kroner, from
which to hang a finding of conspiracy:
Petitioner's original complaint broadly asserted an illegal combination under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Under Parke, Davis petitioner
could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, at
least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price. Likewise, he might successfully have claimed that respondent had combined with other carriers because the firmly enforced
price policy applied to all carriers, most of whom acquiesced in
it.45. . . These additional claims, however, appear to have been abandoned by petitioner when he amended his complaint in the trial
court.
Petitioner's amended complaint did allege a combination between
respondent and petitioner's customers. Because of our disposition of
this case it is unnecessary to pass on this claim. It was not, however, a
frivolous contention. 46
In finding such a conspiracy or combination, the Court changed the
rules regarding the "refusal to deal" by the publisher and brought him
within the ambit of per se illegality. That is a somewhat significant
change to have turn upon the "fact" finding that there was a conspiracy.

47

Some of the various permutations of conspiracy available to the
imaginative plaintiff were spelled out in an opinion by Judge Pettine,
in Stanton v. Texaco, Inc.,4 which arose on a motion to dismiss a very
generally worded complaint:
Suffice it to say that the facts alleged in the instant case make out one
or more of the following combinations: (1) a combination between the
defendant and its dealers to fix prices on the retail level, Albrecht
v. Herald Co., at 150 & n.6, 88 S. Ct. 869; United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372, 87 S. Ct. 1856, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1249
(1967); (2) a combination between the defendant and the plaintiff,
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. at p. 150 &n.6, 88 S. Ct. 869; United
States v. Parke, Davis &Co., 362 U.S. 29, 80 S. Ct. 503, 4 L. Ed. 2d 505
(1960); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 84 S. Ct. 1051, 12 L. Ed.
45Id. at 150 n.6, citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372
(1967).

46 Id., citing FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Girardi v. Gates
Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963); Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965).
47 An appropriate observation at this point is the lack of any reluctance by the Supreme Court in this and other cases to find a conspiracy which was not found by the lower
courts. Of course, all of the "facts" were in the record and "conspiracy" may be "the
legal standard required to be applied" - or nothing but a kind lip-service to precedents
otherwise discarded. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141 n.16 (1966).
48289 F. Supp. 884 (D.R.I. 1968).
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2d 98 (1964); First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391
U.S. 253, 280 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1575, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1968); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42, 88
S. Ct. 1981, 20 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1968); (Judge McEntee's opinion in
Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967) is distinguishable
because there is here both a consignment agreement and prior acquiescence to the defendant's price dictates.) (3) a combination between the
defendant and the plaintiff's customers, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. at p. 150 & n.6, 88 S.Ct. 869. This court is, therefore, prepared to
go to trial on the question of combination or conspiracy.4 9
One circuit has relied on Albrecht and Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
InternationalParts Corp., 5° to find a conspiracy between a manufacturer and reseller. In Sahm v. V-1 Oil Co., 51 the plaintiff leased
a retail gasoline service station from the defendant for a term of one
year; the lease was renewable, with each party able to terminate on
thirty-day notice. Simultaneously, the parties orally agreed that the
defendant would consign gasoline to the plaintiff to be resold at prices
set by the defendant. Thereafter, the dealer raised the price and was cut
off. He sued alleging a section 1 violation and characterizing "the
' 52
agreement and acts of defendant as a collusive price-setting scheme.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed a dismissal of the
complaint. The conspiracy, it held, could be based on a combination
between manufacturer and dealer "even though the conduct... which
caused the petitioner's injury occurred after the petitioner had reneged
on his agreement to follow respondent's advertised price." 53 The court
relied on the proposition that there could be a conspiracy between the
lessor and the alleged victim.5 4
Mr. Justice White's opinion in Albrecht is disturbing for its lack
of business reality. 55 The net effect of the expansion of the conspiracy
doctrine is to render illegal per se those refusals to deal which are
caused by the dealer's unwillingness to accept the resale price suggestions of the supplier. But the discussion in the opinions has centered
on the requirements of a conspiracy, one court competing against another in discerning a conspiracy where anyone who did not know the
49 Id. at 891.
50 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
51402 F.2d 69 (1oth Cir. 1968).
52 Id. at 70.
53 Id. at 72, citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968).
54 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), as cited by Mr. Justice Black in the
Perma Life decision.
55 Note also the problem of the noncombining conspiracy discussed by Professor
Handler in his annual lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass, 23 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 601 (1968).
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paths of a labyrinthine law would see only unilateral action. It would
seem more appropriate to discuss the effect on competition of particular terminations of franchises and the reasons therefor - in terms
other than conclusory fiats.
On the latter point, as FTC Commissioner Philip Elman wrote,
the courts seem to be substituting for realistic economic analysis an old
curmudgeon of English property law, that a seller has lost all control
of his property after it leaves his hands."0 The necessary across-the-board
application of that black-and-white proposition to today's diverse business practices may appear somewhat facile and anachronistic, although
Mr. Justice Fortas seems to have embraced it in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.: 57 "If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his

product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control
over its destiny or the conditions of its resale."58 Rather it would seem
far more desirable to consider whether all parties - manufacturer,
franchisee, consumer -are most benefited by allowing some independence to the retailer while reserving some control over retailing in the
manufacturer who has often expended considerable effort and money
in nationwide promotion and advertising. The alternative may well
be to place all control in the hands of the manufacturer whose name,
goodwill and consumer acceptance is at stake and do away with the
small businessman-distributor completely - certainly undesirable from
an antitrust viewpoint.
A major post-Perma Life-Albrecht holding in this area is Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.5 9 The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between the manufacturer and other dealers to allocate territories and
maintain resale prices. By the terms of the dealership contract, the
plaintiff was prohibited from selling Minolta products in thirteen states.
Minolta circulated a suggested resale price list. It had made objections
at various times when wholesalers or retailers failed to honor territorial restrictions or adhere to the suggested prices. Minolta wrote the
plaintiff objecting to deviations from the sales agreement "indicating
to dealers that they can bargain for better prices" with Interphoto, and
seeking an "end to this type of reckless selling methods." Minolta requested reports from sales representatives concerning Interphoto sales
56 Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 CoLum. L. REv. 625,
63 (1966), as cited by Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 168 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
57388 U.S. 365 (1967).
S)Id. at 379.
59 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.DN.Y. 1969).
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in forbidden regions, and thereafter notified Interphoto of cancellation pursuant to the agreement.
The first point made by Judge Herlands, in considering whether
any conspiracy existed, was, characteristically, that "stabilization of
prices has never been a permissible objective under the Sherman Act,
and is merely a euphemism for manipulative price-fixing."60 Although
stating that "mere complaints by customers of a manufacturer that
distributors and dealers engage in price-cutting and selective discounting are not enough to imply a combination in violation of § 1,
[since they] arise in the normal course of business,"' Judge Herlands
found the required conspiracy by concluding that Minolta's practices

62
should not be condoned.

Where was the alleged conspiracy, and between whom? In some
cases the manufacturer "polices" the dealers out of a silent agreement
that benefits the dealers and amounts to a conspiracy among them.
But the opinion did not offer any support for that conclusion: "Where,
however, the manufacturer takes action and relays these complaints
to the dealers with accompanying words of 'advice,' a combination
to maintain resale prices can be implied. Minolta has gone even
63
further by employing its sales representatives to police the market."
There may have been a conspiracy, clearly agreed to or implied, oral
or written; on the other hand, Minolta may have "policed" the dealers
out of its own motives and perhaps even against the wishes of many
of the dealers. In Judge Herlands' view, a manufacturer's resale price
maintenance policy, if policed at all, is a per se combination with
other dealers, whether or not those other dealers are aware of it and
regardless of whatever other motives the manufacturer may have
had.
Another major inroad upon the Sherman Act conspiracy requirement has been the increased use of intra-enterprise conspiracy
to satisfy that requirement. Thus, the franchisor, operating under
several brand names or through separate corporations, may find that
he is "conspiring" with himself. Until a couple of years ago, Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,6 4 and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
6old. at 718.
61 Id. at 719 n.3.
62 "The facts of record before this Courtdisclosed by Minolta's own communications and in no way denied - persuasively establish the existence of unlawful resale
price maintenance. The blatant and crude techniques utilized by Minolta in its attempt
to coerce Interphoto into adherence to the suggested price list do not bear reiteration."
Id. at 719.
83 Id. at 719 n.3. The sales representatives, as far as the opinion tells us, may have
been employees.
64341 U.S. 593 (1951).
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Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,65 marked the outer limits of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, and they had more often than not been
regarded as aberrations. 6 The general rule has been stated in this
manner:
Concerted action by persons within a single business enterprise is not a
"contract, combination,... or conspiracy" within the meaning of § 1....
All concerted action by two natural persons could be a "combination,"
but this reading would be socially inconvenient and historically surprising. So long as the business enterprise is regarded as an individual economic unit, it must be permitted to act. To say that a single corporation
acting unilaterally cannot "combine" with itself is necessarily to say
that it cannot "combine" with its officers
or employees who are its only
67
means for acting. And so it is held.
But just prior to Albrecht, the District Court for the District of Hawaii,
in Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,68
reaffirmed the Kiefer-Stewart doctrine, holding that the marketing by
one business entity of ostensibly competing brands of liquors could
give rise to the finding of a combination illegal under the Sherman
Act.69 However, unlike Kiefer-Stewart which involved subsidiary corporations, Hawaiian Oke was concerned solely with divisions of the
same corporation. The court concluded that:
Having made the divisions separate and independent for this
particular economic function [sales], defendant cannot now escape
the legal impact of its action. The court finds that Four Roses,
Frankfort and Calvert are each distinct and separate, operating, mar65340 U.S. 211 (1951).
66 See also Distillers Corp.-Seagram's Ltd., 50 F.T.C. 738 (1954). Timken in particular was regarded as weak support because ownership was not completely common and
the lower court had found separate control. 83 F. Supp. 284, 311-12 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
See also Attorney General, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMMrrrEE TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAws at 36 (1955); H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, ANTITRUST LAw 436 (1967). See also
United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618
(1941).
67 P. AREEDA, ANTrrRuST ANALYsis, 236-37 (1967). In Nelson Radio 8- Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953), the
court held "absurd" the notion of an intra-enterprise conspiracy. "A corporation cannot
conspire with its officers or agents to violate the antitrust laws." Chapman v. Rudd Paint
72,745 at 86,668 n.9 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 1969).
& Varnish Co., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
68272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967).
69 The court did not have before it and thus left open the even more difficult case
of double branding by a corporation where all brands are handled by the same division
and by the same manufacturing and sales personnel. Whether every whiskey drinker
knows of Seagram's common ownership, it is not likely that the distributors have any
false ideas. "There is no indication that the use of separate corporations had economic
significance in itself or that outsiders considered or dealt with the three entities as independent organizations." Sunkist Growers, Inc., v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co.,
370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962). See Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D.
Del. 1962).
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keting entities, legally and factually capable of entering into the
conspiracy alleged. 70
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.71 went
even further in finding a conspiracy. Several dealers franchised by
Midas, Inc., brought a treble-damage action against Midas, its parent,
International Parts, two other International subsidiaries and six individual officers or agents. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had conspired to enforce a franchise agreement which was in violation
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The franchise agreement obligated
the dealer to purchase all of its mufflers from Midas, to honor the
guaranty on mufflers sold by any Midas dealer, to sell the mufflers at
certain retail prices, and to sell only at specified locations. The dealership was exclusive within a defined territory and permitted the use of
registered trademarks owned by Midas.
The lower courts entered and affirmed summary judgment for
the defendants on the ground, inter alia, that all of the defendants
comprised a single business entity and were therefore incapable of
conspiring.72 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
reversed: "But since respondents Midas and International availed
themselves of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save them from any of

the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities." 73 That was
so although the related companies were part of a family corporation
wholly owned by a father and son. In Kiefer-Stewart, one of the major
factors in the Court's analysis was the presence of an alleged competition between the two members of the corporate family, i.e., they held
themselves out as competitors. In Hawaiian Oke, the court stressed
the ostensible interbrand competition.7 4 In Perma Life, the plaintiffs
did assert in their briefs, without supporting affidavits, that International sold a competing line of mufflers under the "International"
name.7 5 But Mr. Justice Black did not refer to that and, of course,
there was no proof.
70 272 F. Supp. at 924.

71 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
72 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967).
73 392 U.S. at 141-42.
74 Except for Hawaiian Oke, there has not been any case where two divisions of the
same corporation have been held as conspirators. Alpha Distrib. Co. v. Jack Daniel's
Distillery, Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd per curiam,
304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962). To have section 1 liability turn on whether a corporation
chooses, for reasons of tax, convenience or otherwise, to operate through divisions or
subsidiaries seems too formal.
75 Brief for Petitioner at 38, Law Reprints, Trade Reg. Series, Vol. 1, No. 9 (1968).
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Although the courts primarily focus attention on the existence
of a conspiracy, the recent cases are but an extension of Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co7 6 and Parke,Davis into Colgate territory. The language of Justices Black and White and of the
Hawaiian Oke court regarding the elements of a conspiracy, it would
seem, cannot be applied to a mere collaborative price-fixing charge,
and must be limited to resale price maintenance cases. These decisions, then, are best analyzed as determinations of the legality of
resale price maintenance schemes. Clearly, prudence dictates that, at
least temporarily, the franchisor cannot rely on the Colgate doctrine.
It does appear that the Court is formulating a new set of rules regarding refusals to deal, and if that is what Albrecht and Perma Life mean
when combined, then, indeed, the law has taken a major step.
When the retailer sells his car to the consumer, the expectation
is quite clear that the retailer has no further property rights to the
car, in the absence of some financing arrangement. There are some
manufacturers who cause title to pass as soon as the goods enter the
channels of distribution. There are others who hire employees to sell
their products directly to the ultimate consumer, and also those who
employ agents and distributors in a wide variety of arrangements to
get the product into the hands of the ultimate consumer. "Mom-andpop" stores have a considerable history in American retail operations.
Even in these days of efficient marketing giants and national advertising, certain imagination and initiative at the retail level is said to
be encouraged when the retailer owns his own business. But the "momand-pop" store has not been able to compete on its own against the
large chain or discount house without financial backing, certainty of
supply, technical training when required, and the lure of a nationally
advertised product name.77 The consumer, in this era of mass media,
is shopping by brand name, and not so much by his respect for and
reliance on the individual retail trader. It is in response to this recent
development that the franchisee has arisen, tied in many cases very
closely to the manufacturer's apron strings, but operating for his own
profit and apparently effectively competing against the discount house
and the chain outlet.
The automobile cases 78 do not present a problem for the economic
rationale underlying the franchise agreement, primarily because a con7620 U.S. 373 (1911).
77 See Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchising and the Role of Law, 12
AmNimusr BuLL. 717, 719 (1967).
78United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Ford Motor Co. v.
Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (Ist Cir. 1966).
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spiracy to eliminate intrabrand competition among the dealers or to
put one type of reseller out of business has little or no economic
justification, and is, in reality, a "classic case" of Sherman Act illegality.
And in those cases there was ample evidence that the dealers themselves had combined.7 9 Merely because the conspirators were franchisees
or dealers does not render their combination immune from section 1
illegality since the pernicious effects of concerted action to control
intrabrand prices are just as clear as those involving interbrand activity.
In the newspaper cases,80 it is the combination which might prove to
be the winner-which certainly seems a novelty in American antitrust practice. Of course, it may be said that the Herald Company
could terminate all of its distributors and deliver the newspaper itself.
But that may well result in violations of other social and moral goals
and in greater concentration of economic power; and furthermore,
violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act8 l may occur if acquisition is
the method used.
One thread running through the cases, from GM to Albrecht to
Perma Life, is the insistence of the Supreme Court upon some protections for the "middleman" in business as a device by which to
atomize centers of control of economic power.8 2 The Albrecht rationale
may not even be economic at all; it stems from a social concern that
the "middleman" should not be squeezed by too tight a margin directed by the economic considerations of the publisher.8 3 Analyzing
Albrecht from the point of view of the economist, to provide the most
goods and services at the lowest price, the decision appears to be a
step backwards;8 4 and analyzing the case from the legal point of view
79 A disturbing part of the Interphoto opinion is the lack of any specific reference to
such a combination being in effect, or being inferred from the facts before the court.
80 Graham v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
81 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
82 Protection of the independence of the small economic decision maker is rooted
deeply in American political and legal thinking and is not restricted to a few Populists
of olden days. A. D. NEtrx, THE ANTiTRUsT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

28-30 (1962); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L.
RE';. 221 (1956). One exposition of the need for such protection is in Justice Peckham's
opinion in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897):
In business or trading combinations they may even temporarily, or perhaps permanently, reduce the price of the article traded in or manufactured, by reducing the
expense inseparable from the running of many different companies for the same purpose. Trade or commerce under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and
unfortunately restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men
whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surroundings. Mere reduction in the price of the commodity
dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a class, and the absorption of
control over one commodity by an all-powerful combination of capital.
83 390 U.S. at 153.
84 This is especially true because the publisher has no foreseeable motive in raising
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of a conspiracy to set prices, the holding "stands the Sherman Act on
its head.""5 But, if Albrecht, Perma Life and GM are viewed as applying the goal of diffusing control of the nation's economic resources, the
Court ought to state that rationale explicitly and meet directly the
argument that in Albrecht, and perhaps in Perma Life, it gave too
much weight to such social considerations, to the exclusion of only
slightly less important economic considerations. For competition is
both an economic and a social phenomenon, and to analyze a fact
pattern in terms of feudal rights or unintentional conspiracies is to
avert reality. An accommodation must be drawn, and drawn explicitly,
between such considerations and the not fully consistent considerations
of encouraging, at least selectively, the larger manufacturers to employ
and support dealers not fully independent, but as independent as is
economically feasible.
REFUSALS TO DEAL WITH DIsnUB

TORS WHO

ALSO SELL COMPETING LINES

Franchisors may refuse to deal further with a distributor for a
variety of other reasons which can be troublesome from an antitrust
viewpoint. Among the more common is the refusal to sell to a franchisee who also distributes a competing line.
It often seems reasonable, even necessary, to the franchisor not
to permit his dealers to handle competing lines of goods in order to
protect quality standards, maintain adequate service, insure that the
franchisor's product is not put in a secondary position, etc. But this
understandable desire of a manufacturer, i.e., that his distributors
not help the competition, may very well run afoul of the antitrust laws.
Where such an exclusive dealing or requirements clause is necessary
to protect uniformity, and thaf uniformity is essential to- the product
or service rendered, the courts have indicated a willingness to balance
the interests of the manufacturer in protecting his goodwill and trademarks against the interests of the dealer in doing business with those
companies of his untrammeled choice.
In Susser v. Caruel Corp.,8 6 Carvel maintained through inde-

pendent franchised businessmen a chain of four hundred stores which
primarily sold soft ice cream products. The stores were uniform in
appearance and in operation; each was governed by a detailed Standard
Operating Procedure Manual, which gave instructions for types of
newspaper prices unfairly even if he does succeed in putting out of business all but a few
"specially advantaged dealers."
s 390 U.S. at 170 (dissenting opinion).
86 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
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products to be sold, recipes, nature of advertisements, color of uniforms
and hours of operation. The appearance of the stores was protected by
a design patent; and the ice cream was dispensed from a patented
machine. The Carvel trademark was prominently featured in the store,
on the machine and on all equipment.
After finding that there had been no resale price maintenance
since 1955, the court considered those provisions whereby the dealer
was obligated to refrain from selling any non-Carvel product and to
purchase from Carvel, or a Carvel-approved source, his requirements
for the ice cream mix and certain other products. Reasoning that
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 87 made it clear that Standard
Oil Co. v. United States 8 did not apply a per se rule to exclusive
dealing or requirements contracts, the court found that the plaintiff
had proven neither anti-competitive effects nor unreasonable restrictions and, more importantly, that Carvel had demonstrated a valid
economic justification for the arrangement. With regard to the latter
point, the court held that "the fundamental device" of Carvel's market
acceptance was the use of the trademark which signified to the transient
consumer products of a uniform quality and nature: "Trademark
licensing agreements requiring the sole use of the trademarked item
have withstood attack under the antitrust laws where deemed reasonably necessary to protect the goodwill interest of the trademark
owner." 89 With respect to agreements not to buy cones or paper
products except from those sellers selected by Carvel, the court found
no illegality, because Carvel was not in competition with them. 3 Thus,
the court concluded that Carvel was justified in terminating the
distributorships of those plaintiffs who refused to live up to the agreement.
The presence of the economic justification of the Carvel arrangement and the necessity that a trademark owner maintain the quality
standard of his licensed mark 9 ' will occur more often in connection
with franchises than with other distribution methods. Franchises serve
as a fairly common means of widely distributing a nationally advertised service built around a basic product. But to avoid antitrust
87 365 US. 320 (1961).
88 337 US. 293 (1949).
89 332 F.2d at 517. See also Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d
403 (5th Cir. 1962); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953);
Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935).
90 But that restriction may be for the benefit of the other manufacturer in dealing
with his competition and thus illegal as a restraint on competition in that market.
91 See Comment, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing,

72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
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liability, there must be economic justification for the restrictions; in
other words, it is necessary that there be more than a mere desire to
control the dealers. 92 Because those considerations of quality and
uniformity are inapplicable to patent cases, the courts have held that
93
it is "patent" misuse to forbid a licensee to deal in competing goods.
In United States v. J. I. Case Co.,94 it was alleged that the manufacturer had made it clear to the dealers that they were not to handle
competing goods and had refused to renew agreements with those
dealers who did not cooperate. But Chief Judge Nordbye held that
such action did not violate the antitrust laws:
A farm machinery manufacturer must have independent discredon as to any person or concern which it will designate as a dealer.
If a dealer is handling competitive lines to the detriment of Case, for
instance, sound business permits it to withdraw and look for another
dealer. The suggestion was made in argument by plaintiff's counsel
that a dealer has the inherent right to handle as many lines as he
desires regardless of the consequences to him business-wise. Granted,
but he has no right to require the manufacturer to fail with him.
Surely, where a dealer is so wedded to a competitive line that Case is a
mere stepchild in the dealer's family, there can be no restriction upon
the right of Case to look for another business home in the community.95
Perhaps this is so; however, the "stepchild" is a far cry from the
only-son requirementl The court found for the defendant on the
grounds that coercion had not been shown and that the "quantitative substantiality" test of Standard Oil19 had not been satisfied. In
Standard Oil, exclusive-supply contracts had been struck down as
violative of Section 3 of the Clayton Act because the Government
had shown that competition had been foreclosed to a substantial
portion of those engaged in the affected line of commerce. In Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. FTC9 7 however, the Eighth Circuit struck down
oral agreements not to sell competing lines, 98 holding that threats to re92 Compare Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940), with United
States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951). One clear case of inapplicability

of the Carvel doctrine is the multi-product general store.
93

McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 835 U.S.

818 (1948); National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1948);
Columbus Automotive Corp. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 264 F. Supp. 779 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 387 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1968).
91 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
0 d. at 863.
9 887 U.S. 298 (1949).
97 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
98

"[I]t is immaterial that those who handled petitioner's products were not obliged

to affirmatively promise in express terms not to handle goods of Carter's competitors."

112 F.2d at 782.
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fuse to deal with those franchisees who handled a competitor's goods
constituted an "unfair method of competition" within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.9 9 Hence, as Carter
Carburetorand Standard Oil make clear, any restriction upon handling
competing goods will be tested by the amount of commerce affected
and the economic justification for its implementation.
TERMINATIONS OF FRANCHISEES WHO LITIGATE

When the franchisee threatens to bring a lawsuit against his
franchisor to vindicate alleged antitrust rights and secure an injunction against operation of certain provisions of the dealership agreement, there is a natural temptation on the part of the franchisor to
terminate the relationship. He would, however, do well to think
twice about any such step.
The first case of importance in this regard is House of Materials,
Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,100 wherein the district court held that
Simplicity had violated the antitrust laws by terminating contracts
of dealers who had brought suit against the company, reasoning
that the sole motive for termination was "exertion of economic
pressure to deter plaintiffs from pursuing their legal rights and
remedies." 10 1 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
since there was no specific provision in the antitrust laws which
seemed to cover the situation. The court explicitly held that the
refusal to deal was not an attempt to achieve a monopoly in violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and was not part of any resale
price maintenance scheme.
However, seven months later in Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke,
Davis & Co.,10 2 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit apparently
took the reverse position. Bergen, a wholesaler of pharmaceuticals
and drugs, sued Parke Davis, alleging discriminatory dealing, mono99
In many respects agreements by the franchisee not to handle competing goods are
much like requirements contracts which, if reasonable, have been upheld. In Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), the Court reaffirmed its position that
requirements contracts are not illegal per se and permitted a twenty-year contract for
supply of all coal needed to stand. But Tampa Electric should not be relied on where
many requirements contracts are involved; in short, in the area of franchises. United
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922). See Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky
Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963); Vitagraph, Inc. v. Perelman, 95 F.2d 142
(3d Cir. 1936).
100 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'g P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co.,
191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
. 101 P. W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp 55, 59 (S.).N.Y. 1961),
aff'd sub nom., House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1962).
102 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962).
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polization and an attempt to monopolize. Shortly thereafter, Parke
Davis wrote Bergen permanently closing the account. Bergen moved
for an injunction pendente lite to restrain Parke Davis from the
termination on the ground that it would force Bergen out of the
drug business since Parke Davis supplied a major portion of its
needs and because twenty-five percent of the prescriptions it filled
specified Parke Davis products.
The court reversed a denial of the injunction, finding that the
refusal to deal would further the monopoly alleged by Bergen. The
court relied on an earlier precedent 0 3 which declared "that the court
possessed equity powers to compel the parties to continue their relationship pending disposition of the main claim."' 10 4 Selling to an
unwanted distributor was not viewed as "oppressive," especially in
view of the impersonal relationship that had existed between the
parties. Noting that many of the products supplied by Parke Davis
were "indispensable" to the operation of a retail pharmacy, Judge
Staley concluded that "a court can [certainly] act where a party's
05
conduct is calculated to frustrate litigation."'
Relying on Bergen Drug, a district court recently granted a
preliminary injunction against termination of a litigating distributor.
The court held that the plaintiff had made "a sufficient showing of
probable success" that defendant's agreement contained a resale
territorial restriction in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 0 6
The suit, to enjoin further operation of the restrictive portion of
the agreement, had precipitated a notice from the defendant terminating the distributorship. "There is nothing intrinsically wrong"
with cancellation on short notice, but "the use of a short term cancellation provision for the purpose of violating the law is itself a
10 7
violation of the anti-trust law."'
Thus, a franchisor cannot be assured that the bringing of litigation by the franchisee is always a justifiable excuse for refusing to
deal with that franchisee; in fact, the start of litigation may seriously
hamper the franchisor's freedom of action to terminate.
103 Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 802 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962), under the "Dealers Day
in Court Act," 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25, 70 Stat. 1125-26 (1956).
104 307 F.2d at 726.
105Id. at 728, citing Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925 (Sd Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 815 U.S. 813 (1942).
106 Chapiewsky v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
72,712 (W.D.
Wis. Aug. 1, 1968).
107 Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 824 F.2d 566, 575 n.17 (4th Cir. 1963), quoting
Englander Motors, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11, 15 (6th Cir. 1959).
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CLAUSES EFFECTIVE UPON TERMINATION: "BuY-BACK" AND
"NoN-COMPETE" AGREEMENTS

At times, franchise agreements include certain clauses which
are intended to apply upon termination; two notable examples are
the "buy-back" and "non-compete" clauses. Both are lawful, as long
as they do not unfairly or unnecessarily restrict competition, and are
not intended to enforce illegal written or oral arrangements.
The "buy-back" clause is particularly common and useful in
those franchise arrangements involving trademarked or distinctively
designed products or services. If the "buy-back" clause is so onerous
that the dealer is effectively coerced into continuing a disadvantageous
relationship, a court may find an unreasonable restraint of trade. It
is clear that clauses covering the return of merchandise and equipment must be related to valid business reasons, and may not be
invoked as part of a plan to keep the dealer tied to the supplier.
Similarly, so long as the restraint is reasonable, covenants
forbidding the dealer to engage in a similar business for a period of
time or within a limited geographical area have been enforced.108
Only recently the FTC issued an advisory opinion approving a
proposed franchise agreement between a trademark owner and individual pizza restaurant owners under the terms of which the franchisee would not operate a similar business within two miles of his
former shop for two years after termination of the agreement.10 9
IN PA~i

DELICTO AND THE TREBLE-DAMAGE ACTION

Mr. Justice Black's opinion in PermaLife is of greatest importance
to the termination of franchise agreements on yet another ground.
Formerly, it had been thought that a manufacturer who violated the
antitrust laws in his distributorship arrangement, while subject to suit
by the Government and unable to enforce his contract, was not usually
subject to treble-damage penalties, since the in pari delicto defense
was open to him. That defense has been used successfully since the
turn of the century." 0
Greatly simplified, the doctrine of in pari delicto holds that one
wrongdoer cannot recover from his co-wrongdoer because they are
equally at fault. In pari delicto is to be distinguished from the "unclean hands" equitable defense, where the defendant asserts an un108 Day Companies v. Patat, 403 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1117
(1969).
109 Advisory Opinion Digest No. 278, 3 CCH TADE REaG. REP.
18,483 (1968).
110 Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (Nq.D. Ill. 1900).
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related antitrust offense by the plaintiff as a bar to recovery. "Unclean
hands" is not strictly applicable to legal cases and has never been
recognized as a viable antitrust defense."' In turn, both are to be
differentiated from the defense of "consent" where the plaintiff has
voluntarily agreed to the violation. 12
The defendants in Perma Life raised the in pari delicto defense,
arguing that a plaintiff who agreed to the terms of the distributorship
arrangement was equally at fault if the arrangement were held to
contravene the antitrust laws. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, stated unqualifiedly that in pari delicto was not intended by
Congress to be applicable to treble-damage actions, in light of the
general purpose of Section 4 of the Clayton Act 1' 3 to encourage private
enforcement of the antitrust laws:
Both Simpson and Kiefer-Stewart were premised on a recognition
that the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that
the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws. The
plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may be no less
morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his
suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.
A more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would only result in seriously undermining the usefulness of the
private action as a bulvark of antitrust enforcement. And permitting
the plaintiff to recover a windfall gain does not encourage continued
violations by those in his position since they remain fully subject to
civil and criminal penalties for their own illegal conduct.1 4
Although not stating so in explicit terms, Mr. Justice Black has
turned in pan delicto into a form of consent, finding that consent was
absent and that the plaintiff lacked any "fault" to be compared with
that of the defendants. He stressed that the case did not present the
situation "of equal fault", that each of the questioned provisions
favored Midas, and that "the illegal scheme was thrust upon [the
distributors] by Midas.""15 In rebutting the contention that no one
"forced" the plaintiff to agree to the franchise contract, Mr. Justice
Black argued that participation in the franchise agreement, being on
the whole voluntary, did not make agreement to particularly onerous
111 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 US. 211 (1951).
112 The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan makes explicit the distinctions between in
pan delicto, "unclean hands" and "consent." 392 US. at 153-55. See Note, 78 HAMv. L.
R1v. 1241 (1965).
113 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
114392 US. at 139.
115 Id. at 141.
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clauses voluntary; the dealers "did not actively seek each and every
clause.""" It is at this point that Mr. Justice Marshall would apparently disallow the suit, on the ground that a contractor who "trades
off" restrictions and then becomes disillusioned with the deal should
not be allowed to come into court seeking a windfall as a treble-damage plaintiff. 117 It is fair to say that, with five members of the Court
writing opinions and only four joining in that of the Court, the exact
delineation of the point at which suit will be barred is far from clear.
Professor Handler has seized on Mr. Justice Black's statement that
"the doctrine of in pari delicto with its complex scope, concepts, and
effects is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust action" to
argue that the Court's current position is apparently that any conspirator can sue any other conspirator." 8 But that does not appear to be
what Mr. Justice Black meant and, if he did, in a proper case the Court
may well back away from it. After all, Perma Life arose on summary
judgment. If, after an analysis of the facts, it is apparent that the economic power lay with the manufacturer, the Court will probably adhere
closely to its rejection of the defense. However, the Perma Life rationale may not be applied where the plaintiff and the defendant are relatively evenly matched and enter an unlawful combination with their
eyes open.
One court has already followed the guidelines set forth in the concurring opinions in Perma Life. In finding that the plaintiff was a direct participant in a bid-rigging scheme, 119 the court stated that a
plaintiff who is "an originating, moving, active and aggressive party to
the illegal bid-rigging scheme" is subject to the defense of in pari
delicto: "Plaintiff in this case initially violated the law in an attempt to
secure a public contract. Having failed, it now seeks not just refuge,
but reward in this court. We find no sanctuary in the Perma Life deci20
sion for a plaintiff like this."'
But total removal of the doctrine has not been accomplished.
Justices Harlan and Stewart discussed specific situations in which they
would apply something similar to the doctrine; 121 Justices White and
116 Id. at 139.
117Id. at 150.
118 Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass, 23 RicoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 601

(1968). See the broad, almost off-hand, statement by Judge John Lord in Morton v.
National Dairy Prod. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289
F. Supp. 884 (D.RI. 1968)
72,710
119 Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 5 CCH TRADE RaG. REP.
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1968).
120 Id. at 86,540.
121 392 U.S. at 153-56 (dissenting in part).
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Fortas would compare the faults of the plaintiff and the defendant and,
if the comparison proves fairly equal, deny recovery. 122 And Mr. Justice White would have reversed and allowed recovery on the authority
of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,123 reasoning
"that participation in an unlawful course of conduct would not bar
recovery where the defendant's superior bargaining power led to plaintiff's participation in the unlawful arrangement. '124 Thus, Mr. Justice
White would ignore the technicalities and fine distinctions of the in
pari delicto doctrine and look to the purposes of the private antitrust
action, balancing the strong public interest in vigorous private antitrust
enforcement and removal from the market place of coercive anti-competitive distribution agreements against the interest of not having the
courts grant windfalls to a plaintiff who voluntarily, or even eagerly,
entered into what is later held to be an illegal contract. Although section 4 is indeed a powerful and appropriate tool for enforcement of
antitrust laws and maintenance of competition, the direct benefits of a
successful section 4 case flow only to the plaintiff, and there remains
room for consideration of his right and propriety to the treble-damage
windfall.
Whatever balance is eventually achieved, the practical effect of
PermaLife will be felt by franchisors. In most cases, especially where a
trademark is involved, the economic power of the contracting parties
is far from equal; Midas is not atypical. The prudent antitrust counselor will heed PermaLife and warn of the very serious effects of trebledamage exposure. Thus, the franchisor clearly can be sued by his former distributor notwithstanding the facts that the distributor agreed
to the restrictions put in the contract and that he operated under the
contract at a profit over many years1 2 5 Further, he may be the subject
of an injunction which will order him to deal with that distributor,
even though the latter does not fit in with his policies of good, businesslike selling.
SOME POSSIBILITIES OF TlE CLASS ACION

If the franchising scheme as a whole appears to be legal or if the
area of commerce affected by any illegality is small, it is unlikely that
the manufacturer will be the subject of a government action to correct
122 Id. at 142-47, 147-48 (concurring opinions). See Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d
Cir. 1945).
123 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
124 392 US. at 142-43.
125 Clearly it cannot any longer be said that "treble damage suits brought by
cut-off dealers have uniformly failed." Barber, Refusals to Deal under the Federal Anti-

trust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. RFv. 847, 860 (1955).
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minor anti-competitive features of the scheme. However, he remains
subject to a treble-damage action by any person injured by any activity
which violates the antitrust laws. The treble-damage claimant need
only show a violation and that he was affected by it; and he need not
give much concern to the fact that the violation does not affect competi2
tion outside a very small geographical vicinity or line of commerce.1
Since the "class action" rule was amended in 1966, the threat
posed by the treble-damage action has become much more serious.r 7
In particular, the "opting out" clause of the rule brings into the action
all those who are similarly situated to the named plaintiff and who do
not affirmatively signify a desire to be excluded. That provision has
put tremendous leverage on the side of the dealer-plaintiff, because he
may now seek recovery, not only of his damages, but of damages sustained by all other dealers, many of whom would not otherwise have
desired to commence litigation.
The amended Federal Rule 23(b)(3) permits a plaintiff to sue on
behalf of all members of a class when questions of law or fact common
to the members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members, and the class action is superior to other available methods of
adjudication. 12 A class of six hundred and fifty franchisees was held to
be proper in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 129 although no other
dealer had commenced any litigation or shown any interest in doing
80

so.1

The motives for bringing a class action are obvious, and include
126 There is language in the cases to the effect that injury to the public must be shown.
Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th Cir)., cert. denied,
361 U.S. 833 (1959); Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268, 274 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954). But the violations which we have been discussing are, in the
main, deemed to be injurious to the public. "Congress has, by legislative fiat, determined
that such prohibited activities are injurious to the public." Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957).
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
128 There are four prerequisites to any class action: (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
129 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
180 For representative cases under amended FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), see Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324 (E.D. Pa.
1967); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967);
Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The rule has generally been given a rather broad interpretation. Thus, in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), six hundred and fifty franchisees
were found to constitute a proper Rule 23(b)(3) class, notwithstanding certain individual
peculiarities involving, in the main, ascertainment of damages.
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the possibility of an enhanced settlement caused by the greater potential liability and the chance to distribute the costs of litigation among
several plaintiffs. On the other hand, if settlement is a major consideration, desirability of the class-action allegation should be seriously
weighed by the plaintiff because his representation of other parties
will require the court to scrutinize the settlement closely to determine
whether it is fair to the nonappearing members of the class, perhaps
causing him to lose a substantial amount of control over his litigation. 13 1 Furthermore, the scope of the action may well increase beyond
what the representative plaintiff thinks is desirable, because both discovery and trial will take into consideration the factual situations peculiar to other dealers, especially in regard to computation of damages.
CONCLUSION

Because of the expanded potential liabilities of private trebledamage actions under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the manufacturer
who wishes to terminate a franchise agreement must be wary of the
manner of the termination. Under Perma Life a franchisee may sue if
he can prove he has been injured by an illegal clause in the agreement.
Of course, the best defense is to strike any arguably illegal clause from
the agreement in the first place. But, because manufacturers appear to
desire such clauses and because the boundaries of illegality are not
always clear, 132 such clauses may still be found. Especially in light of
expanding areas of antitrust enforcement in distributorship arrangements, it would be wise for any franchisor to review his contracts with
a view toward insuring that they are not violative of the antitrust laws,
both under the language of present decisions and under rules which
reasonably can be anticipated to be enunciated by the courts.
Furthermore, the manufacturer is legally responsible for the methods used by his salesmen and district managers. Their overzealous "coercion" or their statements, however erroneous, that a particular dealer
was cut off for failing to maintain the suggested price can be very
strong evidence against the franchisor. That situation, of course, is
most likely to occur to the supplier trying to walk the Colgate-Parke,
Davis line. Perhaps the only preventive medicine that can be recommended is a continuing and vigorous educational program designed
to make clear to the sales representatives the limits in controlling the
dealers' actions and the seriousness of the consequences of any miscon131FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
132 Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US. 253 (1963), with Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 US. 593 (1951), and United States v. Sealy, Inc.,

388 U.S. 350 (1967).

52

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

duct. It has become clear that the courts will scrutinize very closely the
"business motives" of franchise termination whenever there is any indication that resale price maintenance or failure to live up to anticompetitive clauses of the franchise agreement are at the root of the termination. Thus, if termination does become necessary and the potential
for antitrust liability is present, the manufacturer should make it clear
in his own records and to the dealer that there are valid business reasons for the termination.
The franchisee must also understand that intra-brand competition
is mandated and schemes designed to cut out one or more types of competition will be held illegal. He, and the associations he joins, are not
free from government or treble-damage exposure. Probably a combination of dealers could be held liable for treble damages to discount
houses or any class of actual or potential competitors foreclosed from
the market by combining dealers. In some cases it may even be the
manufacturer who "goes free."

